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licOrganization theory has, on the whole, failed to adequately address the role that organ-
izations have played in some of the crimes of humanity. The tools to do so have long
been available to the discipline, in work by scholars such as Goffman on total institu-
tions, Foucault on disciplinary mechanisms, and Bauman on the Holocaust. The arti-
cle retrieves the work of these scholars to raise some important questions left begging
by much contemporary scholarship.
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 theory is unaware or uninformed of
ch a statement may seem unenlight-
ly may there be many ways of being
here is also a great deal to not be
. I want to discuss organization the-
 in the sense that it remains largely
ninformed about great intellectuals
ten on some of the most significant
issues of our times, even as it cele-
the most banal hagiographies by cor-
dominant theoretical tradition these
s been institutional theory. Although
s have a few major figures, it is not
ld that it can both write out of history
one of its most creative voices—Erving Goffman—
and not include one of the most creative voices that it
could possibly appropriate—Zygmunt Bauman. Let
me introduce each briefly, then bring them together in
the analysis of one big issue on which it has displayed
a demonstrable record of ignorance. Lacking this
inquiry as a constitutive heritage, it is hardly surpris-
ing that it has had little of public record to say about
the contemporary atrocities of total institutions.
ERVING GOFFMAN
There are many Goffmans because he had an
extraordinarily creative mind. The Goffman I want to
discuss is the Goffman (1961) of “total institutions.”
E: This article draws on an  analysis that comprises chapter six, “The Heart of Darkness,” of the recent book
, David Courpasson and Nelson Phillips (2006) Power and Organizations. The analysis therein comprises a
tantive detail that could not be accommodated in the confines of this short article, touching not only on the
ls of the Holocaust, but also the cases of the Magdalene Laundries, the Stolen Generation (of Australian
en), the German Democratic Republic, and Abu Grhaib.
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Goffman coined the term total institutions to refer to a
class of concentrated power. In many ways, he antici-
pated the themes that were later to become popular in
Foucault’s (1977) work—the power of incarceration,
rules, and surveillance—although instead of focus-
ing on design, he studied action, which undoubtedly
gave greater acuity to his analyses. We are dealing
with what people actually do in Goffman, not what
the designers of their institutions would have them
do. Institutions are total when they surround the per-
son at every turn: They cannot be escaped, they pro-
duce and reproduce the normalcy of life inside the
institution—however abnormal it might seem from
outside (Deleuze, 1988). Thus, total institutions are
organizations that contain the totality of the lives of
those who are their members. As such, people within
them are cut off from any wider society for a rela-
tively long time, leading an enclosed and formally
administered existence. In such contexts, the organi-
zation has more or less monopoly control of its mem-
bers’ everyday life. Goffman’s argument is that total
institutions demonstrate in heightened and con-
densed form the underlying organizational processes
that can be found, albeit in much less extreme cases,
in more normal organizations. Goffman chose
extremes because the everyday mechanisms of
authority and power were much more evident there
than in the world of the corporate “organization
man” (Whyte, 1960).
Goffman drew on symbolic interactionist thought
at a time when structural functionalism was the dom-
inant paradigm in sociology. Moreover, he drew from
the same anthropological tradition, as had some of
the pioneers of the human relations movement (e.g.,
Lloyd Warner, but also Mayo and later W. F. Whyte),
in introducing what were unconventional ethno-
graphic research methods, all at about the same time
that the case study, the ethnographic method, and the
importance of the root social science disciplines of
anthropology and sociology were being marginalized
with the professionalization of organization theory as
a disciplinary space in its own right, institutionalized
within business schools. The historical moment and
the academic space in which Goffman worked are
important elements in understanding the silence
about his work and the lack of attention given to it
until now. In the early 1960s, the systems framework
was being locked in place and, of that which it could
not, or would not, speak thereof, there was to be
silence. Goffman ceased to feature, and total institu-
tions seemed to have missed the institutional band-
wagon, which is surprising because total institutions
are a significant type of organizational rationality
for eliminating equivocality, with practical lessons in
variation, selection, and retention. What is surprising
is that so little attention has been paid by organization
science to total institutions in general (Burrell’s, 1997,
retro-organization theory is an exception, as is the
discussion in Burrell, 1994; for a contrary view, one
should see Weiss, 2000; also see Adams & Balfour,
2001; Hinings & Mauws, 2004).
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN
Bauman is one of the world’s most eminent intel-
lectuals, notable for many outstanding contributions
to social science, especially Modernity and the Holocaust
(Bauman, 1989). It is a work of great organizational
significance precisely because it is a detailed address
of history’s most infamous example of a total institu-
tion, the Nazi death camps. It is a significance that
seems to have escaped the majority of writers and
authorities in the field, for it is rarely cited in the stan-
dard journals.
Bauman’s work is not entirely without discussion
in the organizations literature (see Clegg, 2002; Grey,
2005, p. 25), but much of the discussion misses the
mark. If a central aspect of the Holocaust concerned its
organizational possibility, wouldn’t one think that this
might be a central theme of contemporary organiza-
tion studies? Wouldn’t organization studies want to
focus on this case as an exemplification of how what
was good in organization could produce what was
evil in human action? Might it not want to comb
through the records of the Holocaust to identify the
trail that the Gestapo left behind or conduct oral his-
tories of the few of its victims to survive?1 Or should it
simply seek absolution for its silence? And the sounds
of silence are overwhelming: We know of only one
such oral organizational historical account (through
the work of Chris Grey, 2005) that explicitly engages
with the Holocaust, by Madsen and Willert (1996),
who examine the structure of daily life in a Nazi work
camp. They do this through conversations with the
Danish social psychologist Gunnar Hjeholt, who was
arrested by the Germans in 1944 and spent 9 months
in the Porta Westfalica concentration camp before
being liberated. Much like Bauman, he concludes that
the most frightening thing about the camps as a sys-
tem was the fact that they were, organizationally, not
at all unique. Once inside the logic of their system,
certain actions became routine. They were much like
other systems with which we are all familiar.
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Bauman’s (1989) argument is that bureaucratic
rationality was one of the essential factors that made
the Holocaust possible. The mechanics of the
Holocaust were made possible by precisely those fea-
tures of society that made it “civilized,” chief among
which was rational bureaucracy. du Gay (2000) argues
that Bauman’s representation of bureaucracy is one-
sided because he only refers to the potentially amoral
character of bureaucratic procedures and not to the
bureaucratic ethos of justice. According to du Gay,
racist and party–political convictions, normative and
moral sentiments, rather than the application of rules,
drove the Nazis. Armbrüster and Gebert (2002) argue
that the SS was more a social movement than a
rational bureaucracy, animated by spontaneous
improvisation rather than rule-driven behavior. The
Nazis overthrew the legitimate rule of legal–adminis-
trative bureaucracies through politicizing the institu-
tional organs of the state by forced appointments of
party members to leading institutional positions (see
du Gay, 1999; du Gay, 2000, pp. 48-51). When ends
become detached from means, as Grey (2005, p. 25)
says, substantive ethics are dangerously weakened.
TOTAL INSTITUTIONS:
A NEGLECTED CASE STUDY
By any calculus, the efficient dispatch of millions of
state-stigmatized people to their deaths by the German
state during World War II was an enormous organiza-
tional achievement.2 It is by no means unique. If the
growth of Western modernity is a story of organiza-
tion, it is also a story of death and destruction wreaked
by these same organizational capabilities. The con-
quest that followed the “discovery” of the Americas or
the antipodes, for instance, was another enterprise
requiring enormous organizational achievements of
ship building, navigation, occupation, extraction, and
exploration. Of course, in the case of the Americas, it
was military and religious bureaucracy that played the
main role. This historical event, considered by scholars
such as Dussel (1995) as the beginning of modernity,
needs to be reevaluated in organizational terms. What
was unique about the Holocaust was that it was much
more spatially and temporally concentrated and con-
fined, and the Other that it constituted dwelt in the
midst of the categories of reason, not outside, not as
something constituted as savage, wild, and alien. The
European Other was, in fact, at the heart of some of its
most celebrated cultural achievements.
It is not clear who decided that extermination was
the appropriate solution to the Jewish question or
when they decided. As Higgins (2004) notes, in the
disorderly and crony-ridden world of Nazi politics,
much as in any organization where to succeed means
impressing the boss, senior Nazis who were
rivals tried to outshine each other in Hitler’s eyes
through their bold initiatives in carrying out what
they often had to second-guess as his intentions.
Massacring the Jews in one’s jurisdiction offered a
sure-fire way to impress the boss. Once one crony hit
on it the rest followed suit. (p. 87)
The ultimate goal would have seen the extermination
of 11 million people; the war’s end saw nearly 50%
of the target achieved, given that the 6 million also
included other categories of deviance—the feeble,
homosexuals, communists, gypsies, and so on. Six
million bodies disappeared from the face of the earth,
including 1.5 million children.
Rose (1999) suggests that the actual power of
Nazism “was its capacity to render itself technical,
to connect itself up with all manner of technologies
capable of implementing its nightmarish dreams
into everyday existence” (p. 26). What were these
techniques? Construct an organizational politics
premised on identity/nonidentity and use it to con-
centrate and marshal bodies on the basis of clearly
inscribed identities in a specific space and then strip
members of markers of individual identity. Delegate
authorities to enact centrally conceived power proj-
ects and use expert knowledge to render power effi-
ciently by paying systematic attention to means
while accepting ends by applying intrinsically
instrumental and value-free science. Construct a fac-
tory flow of power—with efficiencies of scale in pro-
cessing inputs and creating outputs and have the
highest authority sanction the organizational action
in question. Routinize actions that enact organiza-
tional power and dehumanize those subject to
power, and always be selective in your mercies.
Maintain a distance between the designated exercis-
ers and subjects of power: Divisions of labor in com-
plex chains of power enable elites to maintain
distance from power’s effects. Make technique para-
mount in the dispatch of power: Obedience to power
is encouraged where organization work is a cease-
less round of technical activity with little room for
reflection. Those who are the subjects of power
should be made complicit in its exercise. Be con-
vinced that the regime of the total institution is the
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best for all concerned; both those in and those out-
with—wrap its purpose in the rhetoric of being in
the “real” interests of both the other and the society
at large. Minimize the possibilities of escape
attempts by spying on everyone and making every-
one aware that they may be being spied on and
informed about. Lock members inside, keep out-
siders outside, and systematically misrepresent the
reality of the situation. Finally, reward the institu-
tion’s keepers with perks and benefits (see Clegg,
Courpasson, & Phillis, 2006, pp. 152-180).
CONCLUSIONS
Today, as the total institution, such as Abu Graihb
and Guantanamo Bay, has once again become a part of
the public policy apparatus to be deployed by
governments against those others that they create,
shouldn’t an ethically relevant and morally concerned
organization scholarship have something to say and be
able to draw on precedents to do so? Well, if it had
many precedents, it might. Given their absence, and the
absence of writers such as Goffman or Bauman, who
might provide compass points, the silence from the
organization science community about such public pol-
icy is perhaps not surprising, even as it remains igno-
rant. Organization theory has a great deal to be
ignorant about, unfortunately. That’s the big issue: In
the small world of its theory, it hardly seeks to make a
difference to the ethics of practice. Histories never expe-
rienced and events not remembered cannot illuminate
total institutions that go unremarked by an organiza-
tion science that ought to be best able to address them.NOTES
1. There are practical reasons why such research is impor-
tant. Many victims (or their relatives) of Gestapo terror are
still fighting for compensation, so such systematic organiza-
tional oral histories have not only important ethical but also
legal significance. In the face of missing formal evidence
about Gestapo crimes, gaining such compensation has proved
a rather hopeless cause for many of the victims or their rep-
resentatives. Until very recently, most slave laborers who
worked for German companies during World War II fought
in vain for compensation. Only about a year ago, 60 years
after the events, was a fund set up to compensate the victims.
Needless to say, many of the latter have meanwhile died.
2. The Prussian elite constructed the German project of
modernity exclusively in terms of an ethnic nationalism that at Vrije jmi.sagepub.comDownloaded from demanded its own strangers, its own outsiders, and its own
enemies to be viable, a role that Jews had been playing for
centuries. They were shortly to be cast the starring role in the
horror that fascism was to orchestrate. And orchestrate is an
apt verb: The Nazi state was a despotism that relied on stage
management, propaganda, and spectacle as its major orga-
nizational devices for creating unity, coherence, and support
to eliminate not only Jewish people but also polyphony
more generally. The Third Reich was a state developed on
the basis of power and myth. Power came from National
Socialists’ command after 1933 of the state apparatuses.
German history provided the myth it orchestrated: a myth of
the German volk and its supremacy, which provided “values
and meaning and ideas and plans and stratagems and alter-
native forms of social organization . . . an oversimplified
representation of a more complex reality” (Bailey, 1977, p. 7).
It created a cosmos within which vast but minutely particu-
larized games of exchange and metamorphosis could occur
(Zeraffa, 1976, p. 77). The signifier of the myth, the ascendant
Reich, presented itself as belonging to a history of the
German people. In this way, its meaning was already com-
plete; it postulated a past, a memory, a comparative order of
facts, ideas, and decisions, and a past destiny that had been
denied, most notably by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, pro-
jected into the future (Barthes, 1957). When this destiny
assumed a form that captured the state, it rapidly assumed
the form of caricature, pastiche, and elaborate stage-man-
aged symbols. Nationalism had been achieved and imposed
from above by elites, positioning the German nation as a
people of manifest destiny, which World War I stopped in its
tracks. When it was revived by Hitler (1924), the Nazis
changed the nationalist project from one that was defined by
elites to one that was to be defined in more popular ways. It
became a popular project in a context where, after the col-
lapse of the Weimar Republic, there was little in the way of
a state or civil society and few national or civic sources of
moral values, education, or authority outside of the National
Socialist Party and little in the way of “constitutionalism, the
rule of law, democracy, civil society, the institutions to nego-
tiate cultural and racial diversity. . . . There was nothing to
prevent the normalization of discrimination and oppres-
sion” (Higgins, 2004, p. 90). At the level of micro politics, the
Nazis sought to implement their myths—based on blood,
race, and territory—in all the spheres of everyday life—the
family, the youth group, the neighborhood—through capil-
laries of power such as the Hitler Youth (see Rose, 1999, pp.
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